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Motivational and cognitive factors can determine the extent and direction of 
information processing in judgment. When biasing motives are present, information 
can be distorted and judgment biased. The extent of this bias can be determined by 
the nature of the information, the relative magnitude of competing goals, and the 
individual’s cognitive resources. Studies 1, 2 and 3 explored the effect of resource 
depletion on motivated distortions in judgment. Studies 4 and 5 examined the role of 
relative goal magnitude (of a biasing goal vs. a specific judgment goal) in the 
phenomena. I departed from the assumption that human knowledge is malleable, and 
that its alteration in a motivationally desirable direction may vary in difficulty across 
instances. It was assumed that overcoming the difficulty requires cognitive and/or 
motivational resources hence under certain circumstances resource-depletion should 
diminish individuals’ ability to motivationally bias judgments. I also hypothesized 
when information is clear-cut (rather than ambiguous) making distortion difficult, a 
  
sufficient amount of biasing motivation could overcome the “reality constraints,” 
holding the cognitive resources constant.  
In my first two studies participants’ resources were depleted either via complex or 
simple presentational format of the information given (Study 1), or via engagement in 
a fatiguing prior activity (Study 2). In the third study (Study 3), I measured 
participants’ stable cognitive capacity as a proxy for their available cognitive 
resources. All three studies provided supportive evidence for the hypothesis that 
motivated distortion is resource dependent. In Study 4 I manipulated the relative goal 
magnitude by experimentally increasing goal importance for either an ac demic 
success goal in line with the specific judgment task or a social wellbeing goal as the 
biasing goal. In Study 5 I altered relative goal magnitude through enhancing either a 
neutral goal or health concerns as the biasing goal. In both Study 4 and 5, orthogonal 
to the relative goal magnitude manipulation, stimulus ambiguity was made either high 
or low.  Findings from Study 4 and 5 supported the hypothesis that sufficient 
magnitude of biasing goal could overcome distortion difficulty even in highly 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The notion that human judgments are susceptible to motivational biases has 
been long entertained by social scientists. Early in the 20th century, Vilfredo Pareto 
(1916), the Italian economist and sociologist, contended that human behavior in the 
service of real motives (called ‘residues”) is distorted to appear in the service of 
fictitious motives (called ‘derivations’) (see Allport, 1968, pp. 21-22). The notion of 
motivated distortions was particularly central to Sigmund Freud’s (1920) concept of 
defense mechanisms. According to Freud, the unconscious Id, driven by the “pleasure 
principle,” is the source of a person’s motivational forces, originating from instinctual 
drives. The Ego, in contrast, represents the “reality principle,” and embodies the 
perception of the world as it is. Defense mechanisms are psychological processes that 
step in where motivational concerns (stemming from the “pleasure principle) clash 
with the realities at hand. To deal with the conflict and quell the anxiety it engenders, 
defense mechanisms bend individuals’ perceptions of reality to forms that gratify the 
Id-based motivational concerns as well. In so doing, the defense mechanisms resolve
the conflict between concerns for pleasure and reality and effect their joint 
satisfaction. Therefore, Freud’s defense mechanisms actually propose possible ways 
in which motivated distortions of reality may occur. 
For instance, the mechanism of “repression” involves the 
suppression/inhibition of undesirable or motivationally inconsistent information. As a 
consequence, persons might be unable to recall or imagine threatening situations th  
may befall them, and construct their realities in agreeable, optimistic, terms. A related 




incongruous facts are refused acceptance. An extreme case of denial is a widow’s 
negation of her husband’s death despite incontrovertible facts (Stroebe, Hansson, 
Stroebe & Schut, 2001; Hansson & Stroebe, 2007) or terminally ill patients’ refusal to 
recognize (what to others constitutes) undeniable portends of their impending demise
(Kübler-Ross, 1969).  
A yet different defense mechanism elaborated by Freud is “rationalization.” It 
involves interpreting a motivationally incongruent outcome (e.g., rejection by a
object of one’s infatuation, or failure at an important task) by adducing arguments 
that the outcome is not really that undesirable after all (e.g. by convincing oneself that 
the rejecting individual was not really worthy of one’s affection, or that the ask really 
was not that important in a larger scheme of things).  
Social Psychological Research on Motivated Biases  
Cognitive consistency theories. In social psychology, notions of motivated 
distortion were paramount in the influential cognitive consistency theories of the
1950s and 1960s (for a source book, see Abelson et al., 1968). In Festinger’s (1957) 
cognitive dissonance theory, for example, aversive tension was assumed to arise 
when willful behavior was at odds with an actor’s attitudes or cherished values (e.g., 
Steele, 1988). Such tension was seen to stem from an incompatibility between the 
individual’s cognitions (that one performed an act at odds with one’s attitudes) and 
motivation (e.g., the desire to think of oneself as a principled human being whose 
behavior is consistent with her or his attitudes and values). To alleviate the tension, 
attitude change occurs that removes the discrepancy between one’s (now adjusted) 




In Heider’s (1958) balance theory, the motivation to maintain consistency 
among one’s cognitions was seen as the driving force behind cognitive alteration of 
one’s attitudes and beliefs aimed at producing relations that are harmonious and 
balanced, e.g. a perception that one’s cherished friends concur with oneself with 
respect to important issues, etc. (for a discussion, see Kruglanski & Klar, 1983).  
Attribution theory. The concept of motivated distortion has appeared in 
another influential framework of the 1960s and 1970s, namely attribution theory 
(Kelley, 1967; 1972, Jones et al., 1972). Motivational biases in attribution were 
assumed to prompt causal assignments congruent with one’s wishes and desires. For 
instance, in research by Johnson, Feigenbaum and Weiby (1962), participants acting 
as teachers imputed their students’ success to themselves and the students’ failure to 
the students. Kelley (1967) interpreted this and other similar findings in motivational 
terms, namely as reflecting participants’ tendency to enhance and/or protect their self 
esteem by making esteem consistent attributions.  
Motivated reasoning. The topic of directional biases stemming from one’s 
wishes and desires occupied central stage within the motivated reasoning paradigm 
(Kunda, 1990; Dunning, 1999). Studies of this genre were carried out in the 1980s 
and the 1990s and examined a broader range of biases than did the cognitive-
consistency and attribution frameworks. For instance, Kunda (1987) found that 
participants desirous of academic achievement recalled more of their academi  
successes than failures, and used their world knowledge to spin theories about how 
their unique personality characteristics may facilitate academic atta nments. In a 




personality traits are conducive to academic success came to think that they possessed 
those traits to a greater extent, compared to the control participants for whom no such 
belief was established. In other research, participants informed that tooth brushing or 
caffeine consumption was unhealthy, reported lower incidence of those activities han 
participants informed that these behaviors were beneficial to health (Ross, McFarland 
& Fletcher, 1981; Sherman & Kunda, 1989).  
Research by Dunning and his colleagues found that people are quicker in 
recognizing a given trait as positive if they believed that they possessed it (Bauregard 
& Dunning, 1998; Dunning, Perie & Story, 1991). In one study, Dunning, 
Leuenberger and Sherman (1995, Study 2) manipulated success or failure with a test 
of integrative orientation. Those who experienced failure (vs. success) and were 
therefore more motivated to restore their self esteem and articulated more self-s rving 
theories of success (linking success with traits they believed to own) than those 
experiencing success (for reviews of the motivated reasoning literature see Kunda, 
1990; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999;  Dunning, 1999).   
The aforementioned research attests that, social psychologists’ interest in 
motivated biases is extensive and longstanding, constituting a persistent theme in the 
field’s research agenda from the 1950s to the present. Yet, despite the considerable 
body of research devoted to this topic, there has been relatively little systematic 
exploration of conditions that may affect motivated biases and/or determine their 
extent. The preponderance of studies in this domain were aimed at demonstrating that 
motivated biases are authentic rather than spurious or susceptible to non-motivational 




between proponents of dissonance and self-perception theories (Bem, 1967; 1972) as 
to whether the results of dissonance studies (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) 
represent a motivated bias or an inference drawn from one’s own behavior and the 
conditions under which it occurred.  
The hypothesis of motivated biases in attribution (Johnson, Feigenbaum & 
Weiby, 1962; Kelley, 1967) has also been challenged from a cognitive perspective. 
Specifically, it has been argued that actors often expect to be successful in their
endeavors given their investments of efforts and abilities. Whereas the occurren e of 
success is consistent with and hence readily attributed to such an expectancy, which 
results in a self-attribution, the occurrence of failure is inconsistent with the 
expectancy, which prompts an external attribution (for discussion see Miller & Ross, 
1975).  
The issue of whether motivational biases are genuine has been largely put to 
rest by clever experimental work within the motivated reasoning paradigm (c.f. 
Kunda,  1990: Dunning, 1999). Perhaps the most compelling evidence for their 
authenticity came from studies wherein the provided information was identical for all
participants and the only factor that varied was participants’ directional motivati n. 
For instance, Sanitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) asked participants to generate 
autobiographical memories on the introversion-extraversion dimension. Participants 
led to believe that introversion is a highly desirable trait recalled introverted instances 
first and generated a greater number of introverted (vs. extraverted) instance , 
whereas participants led to believe that extraversion was desirable exhibited the 




participants were provided with identical information about another person’s 
performance on a history quiz, participants whom believed the individual would be a 
future partner rated the person as better at history compared to participants whom 
believed the person would be their future opponent. 
There is also evidence that motivated biases are not limited to esteem 
concerns. Ditto, Jemmott, and Darley (1988) and Jemmott, Ditto, and Croyle (1986) 
found that participants “diagnosed” as having a (fictitious) enzyme deficiency rated it 
as less serious and threatening to their health than did participants diagnosed as being
free from the deficiency. Those given the positive (vs. negative) diagnosis also 
evaluated the diagnostic test as being less reliable and accurate. In so far as the 
participants were unlikely to possess any prior information about the test or the 
disease, these results are generally viewed as attesting to a motivated bias.  
Dunning (1999) examined the results of other similar studies from his own lab 
(e.g. Beauregard & Dunning, 1998; Dunning et al., 1995), concluding that “the 
traditional counter-explanations for motivational effects (based on background 
information, information conveyed by experimental manipulations, self presentational 
concerns) failed to account for the results of these experiments” (Dunning, 1999, p. 
8). Similarly, Kunda (1990, p. 493) stated that “the case for motivated reasoning 
appears quite strong… The position that all [motivated] biases are due to purely 
cognitive processes is no longer tenable.” This conclusion seems to be generally 
accepted in the field today (for discussion see Kruglanski, 1996).  




Despite such recognition and the manifest occurrence of motivated biases 
across a broad range of tasks, motivations, and circumstances1 the understanding of 
factors that may facilitate or inhibit such biases is still limited. The one factor that 
received considerable amount of attention in this regard is stimulus ambiguity. 
Specifically, it has been predicted and found that motivational biases are more likely 
to appear when the judgmental situation is ambiguous and open to multiple 
interpretations and less likely to appear when the situation is relatively clear cut and 
straightforward.  
For instance, Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg (1989) found that people 
are more likely to rate themselves as above average on ambiguous (vs. unambiguous) 
traits open to multiple construals such as ‘friendly’ and ‘creative’, but not 
unambiguous traits such as ‘intelligent’ and ‘punctual’. Additional studies, too, reveal 
that people’s susceptibility to motivational biases is constrained by their prior 
knowledge. In a study by Kunda and Sanitioso (1989), participants led to believe that 
either introversion or extraversion is conducive to academic success, judged 
themselves accordingly to be more introverted or extraverted. Nonetheless, the 
extraverts still viewed themselves as significantly more extraverted than the 
introverts. “In other words, the effects of the manipulation on self-concepts were 
constrained by prior self-knowledge” (Kunda, 1990, p. 485). Kunda (1990) further 
interpreted the relatively small motivational effect reported by Dunning, Story and 
Tan (1989) as possibly reflecting the fact “that changes in self ratings were 
constrained by prior self-knowledge” (ibid).  
                                                
1Including but not restricted to conditions specified n dissonance theory, i.e., to the commission of a
willfully committed counterattitudinal act yielding aversive consequences [cf. Linder, Cooper & Jones, 




Another example of the notion of stimulus ambiguity and its role in motivated 
biases is Hsee’s (1996) concept of “elasticity.” According to Hsee, “elasticity in 
justifiable factors” refers to “the possibility of interpreting those factors in multiple 
ways…where different justifiable factors have different values and the relative 
weights among those factors are ambiguous” (Hsee, 1996, p. 124). Hsee (1996) found 
that when the information provided is “elastic” (e.g., one option is better than another 
on some features and is worse on other features), individuals istort their evaluation 
of the elastic “justifiable” factors (e.g.,  competitors’ relative standings, job 
candidates’ relative competence, houses’ relative advantages and disadvantages) i  
the direction of the motivational, “unjustifiable” factor (e.g. the nationality of the 
pianist, the looks of the job candidates, hypothetical fiancé’s involvement in the 
choice alternatives), and then make biased judgments that, although explained only 
by referencing the justifiable factors, in effect are influenced by the unjustifiable 
factors as well.  
One study that explicitly manipulated information ambiguity/clairty (through 
relative quality of different products) and found that clear cut (rather than ambiguous) 
information was not distorted was conducted by Kruglanski et al. (Kruglanski, Chun, 
Sleeth-Keppler & Friedman, 2005, Study 3). In this study participants were told to 
taste three soda drinks and pick the best quality one. The manipulated biasing goal 
was to identify or dis-identify with the American culture. Among the three drinks 
“Coke” was shown (in a pilot study) to be instrumental to the goal of identifying w th 
the American culture more than “Pepsi”. Participants were also presented with a third 




condition) where “Shopper’s Cola” was obviously superior in its quality to “Coke” 
and “Pepsi” the ‘focal override’ effect was observed. In other words, irrespective of 
the biasing goal participants preponderantly considered the Shoppers Cola as the 
tastiest drink of the three: “When participants’ focal goal [the goal to make accurate 
judgment] clashed with their background objectives [the biasing goals], the latter 
were quickly sacrificed allowing the consciously pursued objective to prevail” 
(Kruglanski, et al., 2005). However, in the “inferior” condition where Shopper’s Cola 
was poorer tasting than Coke or Pepsi (that tasted the same), the choice between the 
latter two was driven by the goal of identification or disidentification with America. 
Specifically, Coke was preponderantly chosen in the identification condition, and 
Pepsi in the disidentification condition. For the purpose of the current paper, the 
‘focal override’ effect in this study shows that distortion is not likely to occur when 
the information is clear cut and reality constrains are high (i.e., in the “superior” 
condition) versus when the stimulus is ambiguous and reality constraints are low (i.e., 
in the “inferior” condition).  
In summary, the idea that present information and/or prior knowledge 
constrain motivational biases is based on converging empirical evidence from several
independent lines of research. Researchers agree that the stronger such constraints - 
that is, the less ambiguous or “elastic” the knowledge - the lesser individuals’ ability 
to bias their judgments in motivationally desirable directions.  
The Role of Resources in Motivated Distortion 
The notion that cognitive resources are required for the extensive elaboration 




Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM). The ELM posits that if one is 
motivated to render an objective judgment, cognitive resources will be employed (in 
the form of cognitive elaboration) toward this end. However, the ELM also allows for 
the possibility that cognitive resources can be employed toward biased cognitive 
elaboration if a biasing motivation is present. ELM postulate 5 says “Variables 
affecting message processing in a relatively biased manner can produce either a 
positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable) motivation and /or ability bias to the 
issue-relevant thoughts attempted” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). This principle was 
rephrased in another paper, “A wide variety of variables can affect a person’s 
motivation and ability to consider issue-relevant arguments in either a relatively 
objective or in a relatively biased manner” (Cacioppo et al., 1986, pp. 1037). In above 
quotes, message processing as well as consideration of issue-relevant arguments is 
“central” processing according to ELM. Since central processing takescognitive 
resources these quotes mean that central processing (of the message content) can b  
biased (e.g., resulting from a likable source) and cognitive resources can be employed 
for this biased central processing – biased elaboration of the message argumnts. 
Building on this perspective, I will presently explore in greater detail the specific role 
of resources in the phenomenon of motivated distortion.  
To begin with, I assume that all beliefs or forms of subjective knowledge are, 
in principle, alterable. The notion that human knowledge, scientific as well as lay, i
potentially unstable and subject to change has been the mainstay of philosophical 
approaches (e.g. Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1959; Feyerabend, 1975) and psychological 




the constraints (on motivational biases) imposed by prior knowledge are not rigid or 
fixed; rather, they can be overcome under the appropriate circumstances. The 
question, therefore, is when and how this occurs. Three categories of factors appear to 
be of relevance here: (1) The inherent difficulty of overcoming the constraint in a 
given instance, (2) the individual’s cognitive resources and (3) motivational resources 
that he or she may bring to bear on overcoming those constraints.  
The difficulty of overcoming “reality constraints” may hinge on a variety of 
conditions. In fact, that is why stimulus ambiguity is germane to one’s ability to effect 
motivated distortions. Specifically, stimulus ambiguity is one way in which 
information may be easier to distort: Presumably, clear cut information requires 
considerable effort to explain away, counter-argue, or repress, whereas ambiguous 
information is easier to “spin” in a motivationally desirable direction. Additionally, 
however, the difficulty of distortion may be determined by a host of factors other than 
stimulus ambiguity (e.g., the length and complexity of the information given, th  
modality with which it is presented, its being embedded in a noisy versus noiseless 
informational environment, etc.). Thus, in identifying the stimulus ambiguity/clarity 
variable  as a special case of distortion difficulty (rather than as a critical variable in 
and of itself) it is possible to identify other, heretofore unexplored, conditions that 
affect distortion difficulty and hence the likelihood and/or magnitude of motivated 
distortions.  
That distortion difficulty plays a significant role in motivational biases is 
consistent with the view that the process involved in such biases may be quite 




change, referred to it as “cognitive work”, that is, effort required to change one’s 
attitude in a motivationally desirable direction. Furthermore, Festinger assumed that 
attitude change takes place precisely because attitudes are asier to alter than 
cognitions about the dissonant behavior which occurrence is hard to deny. In this 
sense, the voluminous research on dissonance-prompted attitude change (for a recent 
review see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2004) provides indirect evidence that distortion 
difficulty matters, and that the easier path to distortion is often preferred ov r the 
more difficult way.  
Also consistent with the view that the difficulty of distortion matters is 
research by Wood, Kallgren, and Preisler (1985), who found that participants with 
greater access to attitude-relevant information in memory, that is, particints for 
whom it should have been easier to generate motivationally-congruent construals 
generated more negative thoughts in response to persuasion attempts and were less 
persuaded by counter-attitudinal, hence motivationally undesirable, messages than 
were less knowledgeable participants.  
Kunda’s (1990) influential review of evidence for motivational biases in 
judgment identifies two mechanisms that potentially mediate such distortions, both 
likely varying in their degree of difficulty across circumstances: (a) bi sed memory 
search for beliefs and rules that support the desired conclusion, and (b) creative 
combination of the accessed knowledge to construct novel beliefs that could logically 
support such a conclusion. It seems plausible to assume that difficulty of distortion 
should depend on how hard such a memory search, and/or belief construction is for 




desired conclusion are highly accessible, distortion should be relatively easy 
compared to a case wherein these arguments are less accessible or downright 
unavailable (Higgins, 1996). 
I assume, however, that even information that is difficult to distort may be 
distorted nonetheless if the individual has a sufficient degree of motivation and/or 
cognitive resources. Intriguing anecdotal evidence exists that people who are 
extremely strongly motivated to reach given conclusions can distort what to others
may appear as undeniable realities. As I mentioned earlier, Stroebe et al., (2001) 
recount anecdotes of widows whom, for all intents and purposes, denied the reality of 
their husbands’ deaths. Similarly, Kübler-Ross (1969) recall cases of terminally ill 
patients’ who, to the very end, negated the incontrovertible evidence (to others) of 
their approaching death. These observations suggest that the sheer magnitude of the 
biasing motivation may constitute one determinant of individuals’ ability to overcome 
the “reality constraints” imposed by present information or prior knowledge.  
Even more intriguing is the possibility that the occurrence of motivated 
distortion may depend on one’s available cognitive resources. Specifically, 
accomplishment of the potentially laborious “work” that a distortion requires may be 
impossible to carry out without adequate cognitive resources. Depletion of such 
resources by concomitant activities and/or by prior fatiguing tasks may render the 
distortion task too difficult to carry out. In other words, when the individual is 
cognitively busy or depleted, motivational biases may be unlikely to occur. Work 





Chapter 2: The Role of Cognitive Resources 
The first three experimental studies in the present series were carried out to 
investigate the effect of resource depletion on motivated biases. All three sudi s used 
the same paradigm wherein the motivation to distort and resource depletion were 
varied orthogonally to each another. These studies differed, however, in the manner 
in which resource depletion was operationally defined. In the first study, resource 
depletion was accomplished via the complex (hence resource-demanding) versus 
simple presentation of the information. In the second study, depletion was 
accomplished by a prior fatiguing (vs. less fatiguing) task. Finally, the third study 
measured participants’ stable individual differences in cognitive capacity, assumed to 
constitute a significant cognitive resource available for distortion. The description of 
these studies and their results are given next. 
Section 1 
Study 1 
Overview. All three studies varied participants’ motivation to distort using a 
priming technique. In one condition, participants were primed with stimuli designed 
to enhance their goal to identify with their university (the University of Maryland), 
whereas in another condition they were primed with stimuli designed to enhance the 
goal of accuracy. Cross cutting the motivational variable, Study 1 varied the 
presentational format of the information to make it more or less resource depleting. 
Information given to participants contained the fabricated results of an alleged 




competed against Duke University; the results indicated that Duke University slightly 
outperformed UMD. In the low depletion condition, the information was summarized 
briefly in form of a table. In the high depletion condition the information was 
presented via a relatively lengthy narrative. I assumed that the lengthy arrative 
information would drain participants’ cognitive resources, leaving less residual 
resources available for distortion. Thus, I expected that a bias in participants’ recall of 
the athletic results in favor of UMD would be more pronounced in the low (vs. the 
high) depletion condition, but particularly so in the identification (vs. the accuracy) 




One hundred and thirty two University of Maryland undergraduate 
psychology students (72 women, 50 men) were recruited to participate in a study on 
“Cognition and Social Judgment.” Partial course credit was awarded to students in 
exchange for taking part in this study.  Participants’ gender did not yield any effects 
on the dependent variables hence it will be omitted from further consideration.  
Procedure 
Participants first engaged in a lexical decision task (the procedure used for 
goal priming) during which they were subliminally primed with either 12 words 
relating to the University of Maryland (e.g., terps, terrapins, Testudo)2 or 12 accuracy 
                                                
2 These words were selected on the basis of a pilot study wherein participants, UMD students, 
generated words they associate with UMD. A second sample of students rated on a Likert 




related words (e.g., accurate, correct, true). In the lexical task, which as irrelevant to 
the motivational manipulation, participants were asked to indicate whether the letter 
strings they viewed constituted meaningful words. Some of the letter strings were 
neutral words (e.g. chair) while others were pronounceable nonwords (e.g. pind).  
Prior to each letter string, the primes were presented for 17ms, backward masked.  It 
was expected that the Maryland primes would activate their UMD identity ad thus 
the directional motivation to favor their own university in the following task, whereas 
the accuracy related words were expected to enhance the accuracy motivation. A 
funneled debriefing procedure tapped participants’ awareness of the priming sti uli. 
No participant reported any suspicion or awareness of the content of the primes.  
At this point, participants were given the following information: "The Atlan ic 
Coastal Conference (ACC) is testing procedures for granting an award to one 
university each year for overall track and field achievements.  Below is information 
about the performance of University of Maryland and Duke University.  The scores 
reflect performance across many different track and field events, and the ACC would 
like to come up with a way to rate the overall performance.” 
Participants were then presented with the track and field performance of each 
university, either in an easy to read table (see Table 1) or in more difficult to process 
sentences, as follows: 
“ In the relay race, Maryland finished in 6th place and Duke finished in 3rd. In 
the discus, Maryland finished in 1st and Duke finished in 6th. In the sprint Maryland 
finished in 5th and Duke finished in 2nd.  In the hurdles Maryland finished in 3rd and 
                                                                                                                                          
frequently mentioned words in the sample, 12 were sl cted that received the highest 




Duke finished in 3rd. In the decathlon, Maryland finished in 5th and Duke finished in 
3rd.  In the javelin, Maryland finished in 3rd and Duke finished in 5th.”  
Table 1 
Information presented in the low-information-processing-demand conditions 
 
Event   Maryland  Duke  
 
Relay Race  6th    3rd 
Discus   1st   6th 
Sprint   5th   2nd 
Hurdles  3rd   3rd 
Decathlon  5th   3rd  
Javelin   3rd   5th 
 
 
To reiterate, I assumed that the informational format in which the athletic 
results were given in a table form was low in processing demands thus leaving ample 
residual resources for distortion, compared to the same information when presented in 
the narrative format. Overall, the information presented to participants objectively 
favored Duke over UMD. Specifically, of the 6 events listed 3 favored Duke and only 
2 favored UMD. Thus, I hypothesized that in the presence of resources the directional 
bias in favor of their university would decrease the accuracy of our participants’ 
judgments.  
Finally, after the informational materials were taken away from them, 
participants were asked two questions tapping the extent to which they thought UMD 




Maryland should win the award over Duke, and (2) Duke should win the award over 
Maryland (reverse scored). Answers were recorded on 9-point Likert scalesanchored 
with endpoints 1=“Disagree very strongly” and 9=“Agree very strongly.” 
This concluded the experiment. Participants were subsequently thoroughly 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Manipulation check: A 2 (motivation: accuracy vs. identification) X 2 
(information processing demand: table vs. narrative) ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of information processing demand on the item “It was difficult to read the 
information,” F (1,128) = 5.526, p = .02. As expected, participants presented with 
information in the narrative form reported experiencing a greater amount of reading 
difficulty (M = 5.93) than participants presented with the same information in a table 
form (M = 5.13). 
To make sure the two informational formats (i.e., tabular vs. narrative) did not 
differ in their perceived clarity/ambiguity, I had both formats initially rated by 16 
undergraduate UMD students (eight students rated each format). To avoid arousing 
particular directional motivations, the school names were changed from the 
University of Maryland and Duke to Georgetown University and Virginia Tech. 
Results from this pilot study showed that students given either version rated the 
information as equally clear/ambiguous in terms of “which school had better overall 
performance.”  
Judgment of award allocation: Responses to the two questions regarding the 




them via simple averaging to generate a single index of allocation. Consistent with 
the prediction, a 2 (motivation: accuracy vs. identification) X 2 (information 
processing demand: table vs. narrative) ANOVA performed on these results revealed 
a significant two-way interaction between motivation and residual resources, F 
(1,128) = 9.65, p < .005. As shown in Figure 1, participants primed with the UMD 
identity distorted the information more in the direction of UMD winning the award 
when the information was easy to process (M = 5.2, SD = 2.12) than when the 
information was difficult to process (M = 4.2, SD =1.57). A t-test revealed this 
difference to be statistically significant t (128) =2.12, p < .05. Also as predicted, 
under accuracy priming there was no evidence of motivated distortion. In fact, the 
mean in the difficult to process condition was significantly higher (M = 5.0, SD = 
2.01) than that in the easy to process condition (M = 3.96, SD = 1.80), t (128) = -2.28, 
p < .05. 
 
Figure 1.  The effect of resource depletion and magnitude of background motivation 
































The results of Study 1 provide preliminary evidence that cognitive resources 
matter when it comes to motivated distortion of judgments. Specifically, when 
participants were primed with UMD terms assumed to augment their goal to identify 
with their university, they distorted their judgments in a direction favorable to UMD, 
but only when the information on which their judgments were based was presented in 
a non-resource depleting tabular form. In contrast, no motivated distortion appears to 
have occurred in the identification condition, when the information was more 
demanding of cognitive resources and hence more depleting.  It is of interest that the 
present findings are not explainable by stimulus ambiguity or elasticity (Hsee, 1996; 
Kunda, 1990). First, the pilot data suggest that the informational clarity did not differ 
between the table format versus the narrative format conditions. Second, one could 
expect that, if anything, the narrative information should be more ambiguous than the 
straightforward tabulated information. Yet it was with the tabulated but not the 
narrative information that distortion occurred. These results are compatible with the 
present analysis in terms of the resource depletion hypothesized to occur in the 
narrative, difficult to process condition.  
Despite these encouraging results, the first study is open to an alternative 
interpretation. Specifically, the narrative condition could have been more involving to 
the participants for some reason; this might have increased their desire for accuracy, 
accounting for the absence of distortion in this condition. To address this concern, the 




resource depletion in an alternative manner, via a prior task that participants were 
asked to perform.  
Section 2 
Study 2  
 Overview. Like Study 1, the present experiment utilized a 2 x 2 factorial 
design in which the same motivational variable (biasing vs. accuracy goal) was varied 
orthogonally to the degree of resource depletion. Just as in Study 1, the motivational 
manipulations were accomplished via subliminal primes embedded in a lexical 
decision task. Also like in Study 1, the primary dependent variable involved 
judgments of award deservingness by UMD and Duke on basis of information about 
their athletic accomplishments in a track and field competition. However, the manner 
of depleting participants’ resources differed from that in the preceding study. Instead 
of depleting participants’ cognitive resources via informational format, all 
participants were provided with the tabulated (hence easy to process) information 
format of Study 1 and resource depletion was varied by having participants perform a 
prior cognitive task that was more or less demanding depending on the experimental 
condition. I expected that in the identification (with UMD) condition participants’ 
tendency to give motivationally biased judgments in favor of UMD would be greater 
when the prior cognitive task they performed was less versus more demanding. Prior 







Forty-four UMD undergraduate psychology students (29 women, 15 men) 
received partial course credit in exchange for their participation in the study. 
Participants’ gender did not yield any significant effects hence it will be omitted from 
subsequent discussions.  
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the lab, participants were told that they would participate in 
two unrelated short studies.  They first performed a Stroop task, ostensibly to explore 
how people learn to carry out this particular cognitive activity. Upon their completion 
of this task, participants were escorted to a second lab, allegedly to complete the 
“second,” unrelated study, which contained the critical judgment task of present 
interest.  
The Stroop task had participants state aloud the color of presented text which 
itself spelled a given color name. The color of the text either coincided or did not 
coincide with the color being spelled out. That is, green text could spell the color 
name ‘green,’ but it could also, for example, read ‘blue.” In the former case, the 
presented and the spelled colors coincide, making the task relatively easy to perform. 
In the latter case, the presented and the spelled colors differ, creating a response 
conflict and requiring participants to inhibit the automatically elicited response 
indicated by spelled information. The need to inhibit an automatic response to the text 
renders the Stroop task difficult and resource demanding, causing attentional fatigue 
(Kaplan, 2001).  
To vary resource depletion, I used two versions of the Stroop task. In the easy 




difficult version 90% of the trials were incongruent. In both cases, participants h d to 
perform the test for the same amount of time, 15 minutes. I assumed that after 
performing the difficult (vs. the easy) version of the Stroop task, participants’ 
cognitive resources would be more depleted, with less residual resources remaining 
for potential distortion. Pretesting the two versions of the Stroop task confirmed thes  
expectations, as undergraduate psychology students reported significantly more 
fatigue after performing the difficult (vs. easy) version of the Stroop task. 
As already noted, priming the identification and the accuracy goals was 
accomplished in the same way as in Study 1, via subliminal priming with relevant 
stimulus words in the context of a (conceptually irrelevant) lexical decision task. All 
participants were then given the same cover story about universities’ deservingn ss 
for an athletic award, just as in Study 1. After reading the information, particints 
were asked to render judgments on the same items as in Study 1, which marked the 
end of the experiment. Participants were then fully debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.  
Results 
Judgment of award designation: Responses to the award deservingness items 
were highly correlated, r (42) = .76, p < .001, hence I combined them via simple 
averaging into a single score. An ANOVA performed on these data yielded a main 
effect for goal prime, such that those primed with their Maryland identity favored 
Maryland (M = 5.9) more than those primed with accuracy (M = 4.8), F(1, 40) = 4.62, 




independent variables (i.e., identification vs. accuracy prime and high vs. low level of 
manipulated depletion) was found, F (1, 40) = 6.51, p < .05.   
As shown in Figure 2, participants primed with the identification words were 
more biased toward UMD in the low depletion condition (i.e., when they performed 
the relatively easy Stroop task) (M = 6.50, SD = 1.23) than in the high depletion 
condition (after performing the relatively difficult Stroop task) (M = 5.23, SD = 1.46), 
t (40) = 1.89, p = .07.  However, when participants were primed with the accuracy 
words, the trend was in the reverse direction (M = 4.15, SD = 1.27 for the low 
depletion condition; M = 5.43, SD = 2.14 for the high depletion condition), t (40) = -
1.73, p =.09.   
 
Figure 2.  The effect of residual cognitive resources and magnitude of background 





























The results of the second study both conceptually replicate and extend those 




the idea that motivated distortion is resource dependent. Specifically, when 
participants were motivated to identify with their university and “bask in its glory,” 
they exhibited ingroup favoritism by overvaluing the performance of their university 
team, but only when their resources were relatively intact (under low prior depletion) 
as opposed to depleted (in the high depletion condition).  Thus, independently of 
whether resource depletion was effected via concurrent degree of processing 
complexity (as in Study 1) or via prior engagement in a fatiguing activity (as in Study 
2), it appears to have restricted the participants’ ability to carry out the motivati nally 
desired distortion.  
Importantly, the findings of this study reduce the likelihood that the results of 
Study 1 had to do exclusively with informational format and with the possibility that 
the lengthier, narrative form created a higher degree of accuracy motivation than the 
briefer tabular format. Indeed, the present results show that the same informational 
format (the tabulated format of Study 1) that under ample resource conditions was 
subject to distortion did not afford distortion under reduced resource conditions. This 
suggests that factors affecting the likelihood of distortion go beyond the informatinal 
stimulus per se and the distortion difficulty that it poses (e.g., related to informati nal 
ambiguity/clarity and the degree of constraint that one’s prior beliefs exert), and 
include the individual’s processing resources as a likely moderator of motivated 
biases.   
Despite the apparent convergence of their findings in support of the present 
analysis, both preceding studies might be subject to an alternative interpretation in 




motivational states (e.g., by reducing the distortion motivation in the high versus the 
low depletion condition). If so, the observed reduction of distortion effects in the high 
depletion conditions of the two studies might have been mediated by declined 
motivation to distort rather than by cognitive depletion. To address this alternativ  
interpretation, rather than reducing participants’ cognitive resources experimentally, 
the third study assessed the presence of cognitive resources as a dimension of 
individual differences. It is rather unlikely that participants who stably differed in 
their cognitive resources would react differently to the same motivational 
manipulations and hence unlikely that the assessed resource variable would 
contaminate the motivational inductions in some way.  
Section 3 
Study 3  
Overview.  To investigate individual differences in cognitive capacity, Study 3 
assessed individuals’ working memory capacity using an O-SPAN test (Turner & 
Engle, 1989). O-SPAN test has been shown to have high internal consistency (.75) 
and reliability (.88) and is stable across time (Klein & Fiss, 1999).  The automated 
version of the test was used for the study. This test was run on a computer and was 
entirely mouse driven. It contained practice and actual test with the practice 
consisting three sections: letter span, math problem solving and the combination of 
both. During the practice letter span section, participants saw letters appear on the 
screen one at a time, they then must recall these letters in the same order as presented. 
Each letter remained on screen for 800ms. Participants recalled by clicking the box 




about the number of correct recalls. In the subsequent math section, participants 
received math operations (e.g., (1*2) + 1 = ?) and after each problem they saw a 
number (e.g., “3”) and were required to judge if the number was correct solution by 
clicking on “True” or “False”. After each math operation participants receiv d 
feedback. The program calculated the individual’s mean time required to solve the 
equations. In the final practice section which had the same format as the actual test, 
participants received sets of both the letter recall and math problems together. They 
first saw the operation and after solving it they saw the letter to be recalled. The 
actual test consists of 3 sets of each set-size, with the set-size raging f om 3 to 7 
which makes for a total of 75 letters and 75 math problems. The O-SPAN score was 
used in Study 3 as an index of individual differences in cognitive resources. In all 
remaining procedural details, this study was identical to the preceding two 
experiments. Induction of the UMD identification and the accuracy goals was 
accomplished by priming, and the participants’ task was to judge the deservingness of 
UMD versus Duke for an athletic award based on their comparative performance in a 
track and field competition. In Study 3, I treated working memory capacity s a 
continuous variable and the goal manipulation (identification vs. accuracy) as a cross-
cutting discrete variable.  
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-five University of Maryland undergraduate psychology students (34 




course credit. Participants’ gender did not yield any significant effects in this study 
hence it will be omitted from subsequent consideration.  
Procedure 
The O-SPAN task was administered to all participants at the beginning of 
each experimental session. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the 
goal priming conditions where, as in Studies 1 and 2, either the accuracy or UMD-
identification goal was primed subliminally. Participants were then present d with the 
same athletic performance information as in our two preceding studies; this time, all 
participants were presented with the narrative form of the information used in Study 
1. After reading the information, participants were asked the same questions 
regarding UMD and Duke’s performance as in Studies 1 and 2, which marked the end 
of the experiment. Participants were then fully debriefed and thanked for taking part 
in the study. 
Results  
As in Studies 1 and 2, responses to the items comprising the main dependent 
variable were significantly correlated, r (53) = .63, p < .01. Therefore, responses to 
these items were again combined via simple averaging to generate an overall 
deservingness score. I first performed simple regression analyses for each of the goal 
priming conditions. In the UMD identity priming condition, individual working 
memory capacity was a significant predictor (β = .05, p < .05) of the dependent 
variable. Specifically, when the background goal of favoring UMD was induced by 
priming UMD identity, the judgments of participants with high working memory 




goal was primed, individual differences in working memory capacity yielded no 
significant difference (p = .31). A regression analysis was then performed to test the 
significance of the interaction between these two independent variables, with working 
memory capacity entered as a continuous variable and the motivational prime 
variable dummy coded. As shown in Figure 3, the regression revealed a significant 
interaction effect (β = .07, p < .05) in the direction consistent with the hypothesis: in 
the accuracy priming condition working memory did not yield a difference in the 
evaluation of UMD’s performance relative to Duke’s, while in the UMD priming 
condition higher working memory predicted a more positive evaluation of UMD’s 
performance.  
 



























 The results of Study 3 contribute an important piece of evidence to the 




motivated distortion are not limited to situational manipulations of resources but also 
pertain to stable individual differences in resources. Presumably, resources are 
required in order to process stimulus information; to the extent that such information 
is sufficiently complex (as may have been the case in the present narrative version of 
the relevant information), participants with less resources to start with are left with 
insufficient residual resources for motivated distortion.  Whereas the situational 
manipulation of resources may also have affected participants’ motivational states, 
this is highly unlikely with the present, measured, manner of operationalizing the 
resource variable. Such convergence of situational and individual difference measures 
is consistent with the present conceptual analysis and bolsters confidence in its 
plausibility.  
Summary 
 The first three studies provide consistent support for various facets of the 
foregoing analysis. In Study 1, more (versus less) demanding information processing 
(assumed to be more resource depletive) resulted in a significantly lower degree of 
motivational bias in participants’ judgments. In Study 2, the depletion of participants’ 
resources via a prior resource-demanding activity similarly resulted in lower degree 
of motivationally congruent judgments.  Finally, Study 3 conceptually replicated the 
findings of Studies 1 and 2, by showing that individuals endowed with more ample 
cognitive resources exhibited a significantly greater extent of motivated bias in their 





 Admittedly, each of the foregoing studies is open to alternative explanations 
that are rendered less plausible by subsequent studies in the set. The first study, in 
which I attempted to deplete participants’ resources via presentational form t, is open 
to the interpretation that this altered the participants’ motivation by inducing a higher 
accuracy motivation in the complex information condition. This competing 
interpretation is ruled out in the second and third studies, which held the 
informational format constant (using the low demand format in Study 2, and the high 
demand format in Study 3). In addition, the manipulation of depletion via situational 
means in the first two studies is vulnerable to the alternative explanation that this lso 
lowered participants’ directional motivation to arrive at motivationally congruent 
judgments. This problem, generally likely to be present in any situational attempt to 
reduce individuals’ cognitive capacity (e.g., by the imposition of cognitive load), is 
countered by the third study, which measured (rather than manipulated) cognitive 
resources as a dimension of individual differences. 
 Thus, the convergence of findings across all three studies controls for the 
specific alternative interpretations to which each study alone may have been 
vulnerable and supports the present theoretical analysis regarding of the role of 

























Chapter 3: Relative Goal Magnitude and Distortion Difficulty 
Studies 1, 2 and 3 explored the role of the cognitive parameter, namely 
cognitive resources, in the process of motivated distortion. The second part of the 
present research was designed to more fully explore the effect of motivational 
magnitude on distortion in difficult (i.e., highly constraining) versus easy 
circumstances. In Studies 4 and 5 I focused on one specific source of difficulty in 




previously mentioned, although not much prior research has explored the moderating 
conditions under which motivated biases may occur, some emphasis has been placed 
on the effect of information ambiguity/clarity. Specifically, research has s own that 
biases are likely to occur when information is ambiguous (e.g., Kunday, 1990; Hsee, 
1996, Kruglanski et al., 2005). When information is rather clear-cut (in terms of 
which judgment is accurate) and therefore ‘reality constraints’ are relatively high, 
accurate judgment is likely to be made despite the presence of a biasing goal 
(Kruglanski et al., 2005, Study 3). But is the effect of ‘reality constraints’ to be 
generally expected, or does it only manifest itself under specific conditions? What if 
the biasing goal were of a much higher magnitude for the individual than the goal in
line with the specific judgment task? As noted earlier, there exists anecdotal evidence 
that highly motivated individuals (e.g., terminally ill patients, people who have lost 
beloved significant others) may deny these depressing facts, “hoping against hope,” 
that the desirable outcome will occur. Such evidence suggests that even relatively 
unambiguous stimuli that are “normally” resistant to distortion can be susceptible to 
distortion if the magnitude of the distorting motivation is appropriately high. 
Accordingly, Studies 4 and 5 tested the hypothesis that, holding the cognitive 
resources parameter constant, even highly constraining information may be subject to 
motivational bias if the basing motivation is sufficiently strong. 
Specifically, Study 4 examined the extent to which group-learning (seen as 
congruent with  the biasing goal of social wellbeing) was rated as conducive to the 
goal of academic success whereas  Study 5 examined people’s choice (taste 




conditions where a biasing goal of health was introduced. In both studies, stimulus 
ambiguity was manipulated to be either high or low. Specifically, in Study 4 group-
learning was presented as either ambiguously effective/ineffective or cl arly 
ineffective and in Study 5 the actual quality difference between the two teas was 
made either small (virtually zero) or relatively large. Research on ‘unconscious 
choice’ has shown that when the quality of alternative products is similar (i.e., the 
situation is ambiguous), biases in choice tend to occur in line with unconscious 
motivations (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, Kruglanski et al., 2005, Study 1 & 2). 
However, when one product is clearly superior to the other(s) such biases have been 
demonstrated to disappear (Kruglanski et al., 2005, Study 3). Based on this evidence, 
when the two teas are of virtually the same quality stimulus ambiguity should be high 
and when one tea is clearly superior in taste than another stimulus ambiguity should 
be low.  
As mentioned above, cross-cutting the stimulus ambiguity variable, Studies 4 
and 5 varied the level of relative magnitude of a biasing goal to make it either hig  or 
low. In Study 4, either the explicit task goal or the biasing goal was made important 
situationally, and in Study 5 either a neutral goal or the biasing goal was enh nced.  
In contrast to Studies 1- 3, where goals were primed subliminally through a cognitive 
task, in Studies 4 and 5 goal magnitude was manipulated in a supraliminal manner via 






Overview. Study 4 employed a 2 (low vs. high relative magnitude of biasing 
goal) X 2 (high vs. low stimulus ambiguity) factorial design. In this study, the 
judgment task was to rate the effectiveness of group study for achieving the goal of
academic success, and social wellbeing served as the biasing goal. Operating under 
the assumption that all of our participants subscribed to some extent to both the 
academic success and the social wellbeing goals, the magnitude of each relative to the 
other was manipulated situationally via enhancement of one goal and not the other. 
This was accomplished by means of an open-ended question that focused on the 
importance of either social networks or good academic performance to one’s care r 
success, such that the relative magnitude of social wellbeing goal was made high in 
the former condition and low in the latter.  
Stimulus ambiguity was manipulated by introducing either balanced 
information on the effectiveness of group-learning (high ambiguity) or only negative 
information on the effectiveness of group-learning (low ambiguity). According to 
Kunda’s (1990) reasoning on the degree of difficulty involved in motivated 
reasoning, participants for whom both sides of an issue are readily available shou d 
have an easier time justifying favoring group study (i.e., rating it as effective) than 
participants for whom only information contradictory to the preferred judgment is 
made available.  
 Based on the foregoing analysis, it was expected that when balanced 
information on group-learning was presented, people would rate group-learning as 




However, this difference in rating between the two ambiguity conditions should 
attenuate or even disappear when the social wellbeing goal was enhanced.   
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-four University of Maryland undergraduate psychology students were
recruited to participate in the online survey study “College Life and Study Patterns” 
(63 women, 31 men).3 They received partial course credit in exchange for their 
participation in the study. Participants’ gender did not yield any significant effects in 
this study hence it will be omitted from subsequent consideration. 
Procedure 
Participants’ chronic goal importance for academic success and social 
wellbeing were first assessed through specific items in a questionnaire etitl d 
“Things we care about at school.”4  Participants’ existing beliefs (i.e., before the 
manipulations in the study took place) as to the conduciveness of group study to both 
academic success and social wellbeing were also measured separately in the same 
questionnaire. The corresponding items were, “Studying with classmates and/or
friends is an effective way to get good grades most of the time”, and “Study groups 
                                                
3 A total of one hundred and sixteen students signed up for the study but responses for all open-ended 
questions from three students were random characters, therefore these participants were excluded from 
data analysis. Another nineteen students’ data werealso excluded because they either did not answer 
questions that were the main variables in the study (n=2), or their answers to the goal magnitude 
manipulation question did not mention or reflect any importance of that particular goal (n=14), or their 
answers to the ambiguity manipulation were not in line with the probing arguments (n=3), such as they 
disagreed with all those arguments.   
4 Items assessing the academic success goal were, “Having good grades in classes is important to me”, 
“I don’t care about learning knowledge/skills in my classes (reverse coded)”, and “GPA is not a big 
deal to me (reverse coded).” Items measuring the social importance goal included “Social life in 
college is important in my life”, “I really want to be popular among my peers in college”, “I think 
having romantic relationship(s) is important in college”, “I’d like to be a member of some 




help me make friends at school”, respectively. These two measures were treated as 
covariates in the data analysis.  
Answers to all questionnaire items were recorded on 6-point Likert scales 
with the endpoints labeled “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”.  
To eliminate the possibility that answering questions related to academic and 
social success would contaminate later parts of the experiment, a filler task, “Ethical 
Dilemmas,” was administered after the questionnaire. In this filler task, three ethical 
dilemmas (two given scenarios, one based on participants’ own experience) were 
presented and participants were asked to think about (in the first two scenarios) or 
recall (in the third, own experience scenario) how they would/did respond to the 
situation (Appendix A). I assumed that this task was fully engaging and different 
enough from the experimental questionnaire so that it successfully drew participants’ 
minds away from the earlier part the study. 
Prior to the manipulation of the independent variables, to build/strengthen the 
link between group study and the social goal (i.e., building networks), a short 
paragraph was presented arguing that engaging in group study can be an effective 
way of building meaningful and lasting social networks in college (Appendix B). 
After reading this paragraph, participants were also asked to, “tell us, from your own 
experience how participating in study groups could help you build meaningful and 
lasting connections with other students.” 
Next, relative goal magnitude was manipulated. The attention of participants 
in the low magnitude social wellbeing goal condition was focused on the academic 




then write down what you want to do after graduating from college, and how good 
performance in your classes (e.g., earning a high GPA) could help? Do you agree that 
people who do well with their classes in college also tend to become more successful 
later in their lives?” In contrast, participants in the high magnitude social wellbeing 
goal condition were given the following instructions: “Think for a few minutes and 
then write down what you want to do after graduating from college and how social 
networks (e.g., with classmates) you build in college could help? Do you agree that 
people who are popular in college also tend to become more successful later in their 
lives?” Participants’ answers to these questions served as a manipulation check 
intended to investigate whether either the academic success or the social wellbeing 
goal, depending on the specific goal-focusing question, was indeed seen as important. 
Following the manipulation of the relative goal magnitude, I experimentally 
varied the factor of stimulus ambiguity.  In the high ambiguity condition an equal 
number of positive and negative arguments about group-learning were provided, 
while in the low ambiguity condition only disadvantages of group-learning were 
presented. The total number of arguments was kept constant for both conditions. In 
order to strengthen the impact of this manipulation, participants were also asked to 
provide an example for each of these argument drawn from their personal experience. 
Specific arguments and questions are given in Appendix C.  
Next, came the question meant to tap the main dependent variable, namely: 
“Overall, how effective do you personally think group-learning is in achieving 
academic success in college?” responses to this item were recorded using a 7-point 




“Extremely effective”. Afterwards, demographic information, including GPA, was 
collected and participants were provided with a debriefing sheet.  
Results 
Manipulation check: Participants’ answers to the open-ended question used to 
enhance either the academic success or social wellbeing goal served as a check for the 
relative goal magnitude manipulation. As expected, participants in the former goal 
condition explicitly stated in their answers to this open-ended question that good 
performance in classes or high GPA was important to them, while those in the latter 
goal condition described the importance of social networks in their lives. The 
manipulation check for stimulus ambiguity is discussed in the ANCOVA results. 
Descriptive statistics: As shown in Figure 4, the dependent measure had a 
mean of 5.00 (SD = .69) under high stimulus ambiguity (i.e., low distortion difficulty) 
and a mean of 3.76 (SD = 1.70) under low stimulus ambiguity (i.e., high distortion 
difficulty), with a higher value indicating greater favoritism towards group-learning, 
when the academic success goal was enhanced. When the social wellbeing goal was 
enhanced, the mean value for the dependent measure was 5.00 (SD = 1.04) under high 
ambiguity and 4.58 (SD = 1.02) under low ambiguity.5 
                                                
5 Correlations: Pair-wise correlations were calculated for all items tapping academic success goal and 
social wellbeing goal, the measures of people’s exiting belief on the effectiveness of study group to 
getting good grades and on how helpful study groups help to make friends, GPAs, as well as the 
dependent measure. The resulting correlation matrix is given in Table 2. The dependent variable (i.e., 
how effective is group-learning to achieving academic success) is significantly correlated with four 
items: “having good grades is important” (r = .29, p < .005), “learning is important” (r = .26, p < .05), 
“studying with classmates/friends is effective to get ood grades” (r = .39, p < .001) and “study groups 
help me make friends” (r = .46, p < .001), respectively.  
A factor analysis was carried out on the questionnaire containing all items measuring academic success 
and social wellbeing goals for the purpose of data reduction. The two factors extracted appeared to 
represent the social wellbeing and academic success goal , respectively. Items with single loading 
greater than .50 were selected. This resulted in the selection of all three academic success items and 




Figure 4. The effect of relative goal magnitude and stimulus ambiguity on perceived 
effectiveness of group-learning  
                                                                                                                                          
an active social life”. Index variables –overall existing academic success goal and overall existing 
social wellbeing goal – were created by averaging the scores from each group of items. 
Neither the average existing academic success goal nor the average existing social wellbeing goal 
contributed significantly more to the variance in the dependent measure, beyond the variables already 
in the ANCOVA model. Therefore they were left out of the model. The variable of participants’ GPAs 
was not included in the model for the same reason. 
 
Table 2 
Correlations between key items in the questionnaire in Study 4  
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
(a) Grades important .30* .59** .19 .10 .06 .09 -.03 .17 .28** .29** .36** 
(b) Learning important  .19 -.15 .09 -.12 -.06 -.06 -.02 .19 .26* .07 
(c) GPA important   .05 .03 .03 .02 .09 -.04 .25* .20 .34** 
(d) Social Life important   .16 .56** .26* .31** .58** .22* .15 -.11 
(e) Group Study effective    .08 .12 .12 .09 .35** .39** -.05 
(f) Want to be popular      .17 .28* .38** .08 .03 -.05 
(g) Romantic relation important      .14 .23* -.02 -.03 .03 
(h) Want to be Sorority/Fraternity member      .19 -.08 .15 -.11 
(i) Active social life         .19 .07 .00 
( j) Study Groups help make friends        .46** .14 
(k) Group-Learning effective         -.01 
(l) GPA             
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




































Next, an ANCOVA was carried out to look at the effects of the two 
independent variables (i.e., relative goal magnitude and stimulus ambiguity) on the 
dependent measure. Two items, asked prior to the manipulations employed in the 
study, were entered as covariates as planned in the study design. These items assessed 
existing beliefs regarding the conduciveness of group study to both the academic 
success and social wellbeing. Specifically, these two items were, ‘Studying with 
classmates/friends is an effective way to get good grades most of the time’ and ‘Study 
groups help me make friends at school’.  
Covariates: Results show that existing belief regarding the conduciveness of 
study groups to the social wellbeing goal (i.e., making friends) was a significant 
predictor (F (1, 88) = 15.33, p <.001) of the dependent measure. This indicates that 
people who believe study groups are conducive to their social wellbeing goal tend to 
view study groups as also effective to their academic success goal. Moreover, the 
existing perception of the effectiveness of group study to achieving academic success 
(i.e., good grades) also predicted the dependent measure (F (1, 88) = 11.85, p = .001). 




study was effective to getting good grades prior to the study, they tended to still think 
it was effective for academic success at the end of the study. This result also supports 
the idea that people’s judgments are constrained by their prior beliefs/attitudes. 
Independent variables and their interaction: After the above two measures 
were covaried out, there was a significant interaction between the two independent 
variables, F (1, 88) = 4.69, p < .05. Relative goal magnitude did not have an overall 
main effect on the dependent measure (F (1, 88) = 1.68, p = .20), while stimulus 
ambiguity did, F (1, 88) = 10.63, p < .005.  
The contrast between the two goal conditions under low ambiguity (only 
negative information) was significant, t (85) = 2.22, p < .05, showing that although 
people for whom the importance of the academic goal was elevated responded to the 
highly constraining information (i.e., all negative arguments available) quite 
accurately, those for whom the social wellbeing goal was enhanced still demonstrated 
significant biases in favor of group-learning. The contrast between the two ambiguity 
conditions under the academic success goal was also significant, t (85) = 3.50, p = 
.001, indicating that without the presence of a biasing goal people’s responses 
reflected the difference in the effectiveness of group-learning conveyed by the 
corresponding information in the two conditions.  
The contrast in evaluation of group-learning between the two ambiguity 
conditions under the academic success goal also provides a check for the 
manipulation of this variable. Indeed, although group-learning was viewed quite 




were given to the participants, it was rated much more negatively (M = 3.76, SD = 
1.70) when only its disadvantages were presented.  
The difference between ambiguity conditions under the social wellbeing goal 
was not statistically significant (85) = 1.21, p = .23), indicating that participants 
with the biasing goal enhanced were not constrained by the clearly negative 
information in the low ambiguity condition and, in spite of it, still largely favored 
group-learning as effective for achieving academic success. 
Discussion 
The significant interaction obtained in Study 4 indicates that when people 
focused on the judgment task per se they appeared to be more accurate and their 
responses largely reflected the inherent accuracy in the judgmental option (i.e., the 
effectiveness of group-learning) given the information available in the situation. 
Importantly, however, when people’s social wellbeing goal was enhanced, they 
overcame the difficulty of distortion stemming from the constraining all-negative 
information about group-learning that was congruent with this biasing goal. 
The effect of people’s existing beliefs about the conduciveness of study 
groups to making friends on their judgment of its effectiveness in achieving academic 
success supports the assumption that people would favor group-learning in the current 
judgment task because it was believed to serve the biasing goal. Moreover, 
unsurprisingly, people’s final judgments on the effectiveness of group-learning were 
largely consistent with their prior beliefs on the same issue assessed in the beginning 




people’s prior knowledge/attitudes on motivated biases, in line with Kunda’s 
reasoning (1990). 
Interestingly, the average existing academic success goal and social wellbeing 
goal assessed in the questionnaire prior to any experimental manipulations did not
predict people’s final judgment. Together with the predicting power of the two 
covariates, this suggests that it was not just what chronic goals the participants 
subscribed to that affected their  judgments; rather what seemed to matter was which 
goal was situationally dominant and also whether  participants believed that the 
specific means was conducive to  that goal,. 
In summary, results from Study 4 provide support for the hypothesis that 
clear-cut (rather than ambiguous) information makes distortion difficult, however, 
this difficulty can be overcome when the relative magnitude of the biasing goal is 
high enough.  
Though the overall pattern of Study 4 results is consistent with my analysis, 
there is one seeming exception to this assessment: I had expected a difference 
between the two goal-enhancement conditions (greater distortion under enhancement 
of the social wellbeing goal versus no enhancement) when the information provided 
on group-learning was balanced and distortion difficulty was low. However, in fact, 
participants in the social wellbeing goal condition did not seem to favor group-
learning more than those with the academic success goal enhanced. One possible 
explanation for this result is that since the dependent measure question was framed in 
terms of achieving academic success, which was made highly desirable in the context 




group-learning when balanced information was available. This is similar to the 
finding by Kunda (1987) that when academic achievement was made desirable 
participants recalled more of their academic successes than failures, and came up with 
self-serving theories about how their unique personality characteristics may 
contribute to academic attainments. Also, Kunda and Sanitioso (1989) found that 
when certain personality traits were presented as conducive to academic success 
people reported possessing more of those traits than did the control participants. In 
this sense, even the people with academic goal enhanced in Study 4 may have been 
“biased” and thus had an easier time distorting the information when positive 
arguments about group-learning were readily available (Higgins, 1996). However, 
when only negative arguments were present such distortion was difficult. Therefore, 
their low evaluation of group-learning reflected ‘reality’. On the other hand, even 
when only negative arguments about group-learning were provided, participants in 
the social wellbeing goal condition had a strong enough motivation to favor group-
learning and overcome the ‘reality constraints’. Another possibility is that participants 
from both goal enhancement conditions under stimulus ambiguity rated group-
learning equally positively, probably due to a ceiling effect so that increasing 
magnitude of the biasing goal did not matter. 
To investigate the foregoing possibilities, Study 5 manipulated the relative 
magnitude of a biasing health goal to general life concerns that are presumably 
neutral to the judgment task of tea tasting used in that study. Therefore, the high 




biasing health goal compared to the neutral goal condition, when the situation is 
ambiguous. 
Study 5 was also carried out in order to further explore the role of distortion 
difficulty induced by unambiguous stimuli and the overriding effect (i.e., overriding 
highly constraining information) of a relatively strong biasing goal. To affrd 
generalization of the results across instances, a different paradigm and an lternative 
way of operationalizing the two independent variables were adopted. Specifically, 
Study 5 manipulated stimulus ambiguity in the same manner as in classic 
‘unconscious choice’ studies (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Kruglanski et al., 2005, 
Study 1 - 4; Kim et al., 2007), either using similar/same quality products to make the 
situation ambiguous or having one product clearly superior to the alternatives 
rendering stronger constraints to biases. In Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) studies, 
passersby asked to choose among four different nightgowns of a similar quality or 
among four identical pairs of nylon stockings at a department store heavily overchose 
the two rightmost objects in the array. Presumably participants in these studies 
possessed a biasing goal to make a quick decision and the two rightmost objects in 
the array served this goal. This explanation was tested and supported by a series of 
studies conducted by Kruglanski and his colleagues (2005, Study 1).  
The Tea Tasting Paradigm 
Study 5 also adopted the “tea tasting” paradigm originally used by Kim and 
Mitchell (2007) in which the quality of two types of iced teas and the magnitude of 
health concerns was altered in order to give rise to a biasing goal in a taste judgment 




the experimental condition while this goal was absent in the control condition. 
Participants were asked to choose the better tasting of two iced teas, one of which was 
diluted by water such that it contained only 95% of the original content. The two 
drinks were labeled differently with the diluted one implicitly promising ‘health.’ 
Kim et al. found that a significantly larger percentage of participants in the health 
goal prime condition chose the diluted drink compared to those in the control 
condition. Although data from a pilot study showed that the original tea was 
accurately chosen as better tasting by another sample of participan s and the two 
labels were not perceived differently in their attractiveness, the participants in the 
actual study who judged the diluted drink to be better tasting justified heir choice in 
terms of the taste of the tea.  
Although distortion was found, the tea difference created in Kim et al’s study 
was quite minimal. There was a 60% (N = 50) choice of the non-diluted tea in their 
pilot blind taste test but this difference was not significant. Therefore, the results from 
their study do not provide compelling evidence to support the idea that strong biasing 
goal could overcome the ‘focal override’ effect found by Kruglanski et al. (2005, 
Study 3). To make the reality constraints great enough to demonstrate that strong 
motivation could overcome distortion difficulty even in extreme circumstances, Study
5 aimed to create a significant difference in the subjective taste between the two teas 
in an unambiguous (high constraining) condition while keeping a no-difference 
(ambiguous) condition as a control to replicate the results from classic ‘unconscious 








Overview. Study 5 went beyond Kim et al.’s study by adding and varying the 
parameter of stimulus ambiguity. Specifically, in Study 5, stimulus ambiguity was 
manipulated as a two-level factor, such that in one condition ambiguity was high, 
with no dilution for the ‘nutrition essential’ tea making the two options virtually the 
same, while in the other condition ambiguity was low, with the diluted ‘nutrition 
essential’ tea containing only 80% of the original tea.  Orthogonal to the ambiguity 
manipulation, relative goal magnitude was manipulated by enhancing either health 
concerns or concepts neutral to the judgment. Specifically, to increase the relaiv  
magnitude of the biasing health goal, a ‘health’ version of a ‘Life Style Profile’ 
(Walker et al., 1987) was used, with only items relevant to health in the original 
profile included. As examples of items in the profile participants were asked to 
indicate how often they engaged in activities such as ‘Checking cholesterol lev l’, 
and ‘attending health care programs’.  I assumed that reading and thinking about such 
activities would serve to situationally enhance participants’ health concerns. In the 
control condition, participants were given a general version of the ‘Life StylProfile’ 
(Walker et al., 1987) with the original items relevant to health taken off. Examples of 
this profile include items inquiring into frequency of engagement in 
‘Enthusiastic/Optimistic’, and ‘Recreational activities’. I assumed that these items 




Overall, study 5 employed a 2 (high vs. low health goal as the biasing goal) X 
2 (high vs. low stimulus ambiguity) factorial design. It was expected that in the 
control condition, participants would be sensitive to the actual taste difference (or 
lack thereof) between the two iced teas. Thus, I expected that participan s would 
choose the original tea as better tasting than the diluted tea or cho se the two teas 
equally in the absence of dilution. In contrast, I expected that when a health concern 
was enhanced, participants would favor the ‘nutrition essential’ tea as the tastier tea. 
Most importantly, I expected that participants with an enhanced health goal would 
overcome the ‘reality constraints’ imposed by the 20% dilution (for the nutrition 
essential tea) and still exhibit bias towards the nutrition essential tea. 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and seventy-nine University of Maryland students (83 women, 
96 men) were actively approached and recruited on UMD campus through a ‘tea 
tasting’ task. A free snack was given to each participant at the end of the task. 
Participants’ gender did not yield any significant effect hence it will be omitted from 
subsequent discussions.  
Procedure 
The study was advertised as ‘Tea Tasting and Free Snack’. Experimenters 
approached potential participants on campus and explained the task procedure. Upon 
providing oral consent, participants first filled out a ‘Life Style Profile’. Then they 
were given two samples of iced teas to taste and asked to judge which tea tasted 




The iced tea used in the current study was made out of Lipton Iced Tea 
powder. As in Kim et al.’s study (2007), one tea was labeled ‘everyday life smooth’ 
whereas the other was labeled ‘nutrition essential.’ In addition, two levels of stimulus 
ambiguity were created through either 0% (i.e., no) dilution or 20%dilution for the 
‘nutrition essential’ tea, keeping the original quality for the ‘everyday smooth’ tea 
(based on the water- tea powder ratio suggested on the product package). When there 
was no dilution for the ‘nutrition essential’ tea the two teas were actually of the same 
quality and taste and differed only in their attached label, therefore, the stimulus 
ambiguity in terms of their taste was extremely high. On the ot r hand, when the 
‘nutrition essential’ tea was diluted by 20%, the taste information was rather clear and 
ambiguity was low. The dependent measure was the participants’ choice of the better 
tasting tea. Reasons for their choice were also recorded as was done in the Kim and 
Mitchell (2007) study. Upon completing the task, every participant was offered a 
choice from among a variety of snacks and drinks, including healthy ones such as 
water and fruit & nut bars, as well as unhealthy ones such as chocolate bars and Coke. 
Their choice of either a healthy or unhealthy snack/drink was record d for analysis as 
well. Given the naturalistic setting of the study, debriefing every participant was not 
practical. However, anyone who inquired about the nature of the study was fully 
debriefed.   
Since people’s tastes for iced teas vary, to find out whether statistic lly-
speaking there was an actual preference for the non-diluted tea over the diluted tea 
among University of Maryland students on campus, a pilot study on tea taste was 




These students tasted samples of the original tea and the 20% diluted tea with no 
labels and made a judgment as to which tea was tastier. 
Results 
Manipulation check: Chi-square test with an independent sample of 40 
students on the perceived taste difference between the original tea and the 20% 
diluted tea revealed a significant taste preference for the original tea over the diluted 
tea. Specifically, 27 (or 67.5%) of the 40 pilot study participants chose the original 
tea as tastier, χ2 (1, N = 40) = 4.90, p <.05.    
Tea taste preference: A logistic regression was carried out to examine the 
effect of relative goal magnitude and stimulus ambiguity on choice as the dependent 
variable. There was a main effect of relative goal magnitude, β = 1.41, p < .005, 
indicating that there was significant over-choosing of ‘nutrition essential’ tea when 
the background health goal was enhanced. The main effect of stimulus ambiguity was 
also approaching significance with two-tailed test, β = .77, p = .086.  
As shown in Figure 5, when the health goal was not enhanced, that is, when 
the general version of ‘Life Style Profile’ was given, participants’ choices reflected 
the actual taste difference in the two teas. Specifically, when there was no dilution to 
the ‘nutrition essential’ tea participants under no health goal enhancement actually 
chose either tea to the same extent (50% of participants chose either tea), χ2 (1, N = 
46) = .00, p = 1.00. Moreover, when the ‘nutrition essential’ tea was diluted by 20%, 
68.29% of participants under no health goal enhancement actually chose the original 
‘everyday smooth’ tea as tastier, χ2 (1, N = 41) = 5.49, p < .05. This result also 










































Figure 5 shows that when background health goal was enhanced, 80.43% of 
participants in the no-dilution condition (χ2 (1, N = 46) = 17.04, p < .001) and 71.74% 
of participants in the 20% dilution condition (χ2 1, N = 46) = 8.70, p < .005) chose 
the ‘nutrition essential’ tea. 
Simple effect of health goal enhancement was significant for both dilution (β 
= 1.70, p < .001) and no-dilution (β = 1.41, p < .005) conditions. Although there was 
no preference for either tea under no-dilution when participants were given the 
general version of “Life Style Profile” to complete, those who received the health 
version of the profile demonstrated a clear preference for the nutrition esse tial tea. 
Even under the dilution condition where justifying choosing the diluted tea was more 
difficult (reflected by the normal preference pattern in the neutral goal condition as 
well as the pilot test result) participants with enhanced health concerns still preferred 
the diluted nutrition essential tea.  The choice pattern was reversed when the heal  




The simple effect of tea dilution under neutral condition was approaching 
significance with two-tailed test (β = .77, p = .086), suggesting that participants were 
sensitive to the actual taste difference/no-difference between the teas. Tea dilution did 
not seem to exert any impact on the choices when the health goal was enhanced as i  
both dilution and non-dilution conditions the diluted nutrition essential tea was 
greatly preferred to the original everyday smooth tea. 
The interaction between the two independent variables was not statistically 
significant.  
As found in Kim et al.’s study, the reasons participants provided for their 
choice of either tea were framed in terms of taste. People choosing the original tea 
said the tea was ‘sweeter’, ‘smoother’, had a ‘stronger taste’ and so on, and those who 
chose the diluted tea told us that it tasted ‘lighter’, ‘less sweet’, had a ‘better texture’, 
etc. 
Discussion  
Results from Study 5 are consistent with my expectations regarding the roles 
of relative goal magnitude and stimulus ambiguity in motivated biases. Specifically, 
although participants under neutral goal enhancement were sensitive to the actual 
taste difference (or lack thereof) between the two tea options, those with health goal 
enhanced seemed to have been able to overcome whatever constraints were imposed 
by such ‘reality’. There was a significant bias in choice favoring the ‘nutrition 
essential’ tea when the two teas were virtually the same (i.e., no dilution condition). 
More interestingly, with the health goal enhanced, even when the ‘nutrition esse tial’ 




‘everyday smooth’ tea, representing a complete reversal of the findings in the neutral 
goal condition.  
Study 5 created a subjective taste difference that was statistically significant, 
as demonstrated by the Chi-square statistic from the pilot test with an independent 
sample of participants and the 20%-dilution/neutral goal condition in the actual study, 
as well as the contrast between dilution conditions under neutral goal. These results 
suggest that the 20% diluted tea was indeed viewed as less tasty than the non-diluted 
tea, and therefore it would be more difficult to justify choosing the diluted nutrition 
essential tea as the tastier tea, compared to the situation where the two teas ere 
essentially the same. Nonetheless, significant biases in choice still occurred under 
such highly constraining circumstances. As mentioned earlier, the taste differ nce 
created in the original tea tasting study by Kim and her colleagues was quite minimal, 
with a non-significant taste preference statistic in a blind pilot test. Findings in Study 
5 are thus more conclusive in demonstrating the overriding power of a strong biasin 
goal to overcome the extreme constraints of an unambiguous situation.  
The non-dilution (high ambiguity) condition in Study 5 did show a significant 
difference in preference as a function of relative goal magnitude which Study 4 failed 
to demonstrate. As discussed earlier, under the high ambiguity condition in Study 4 
people with the biasing social wellbeing goal did not evaluate group-learning more 
favorably than did those with the academic success goal, presumably because people 
with the enhanced academic success goal were also biased in their judgments by 




complements the findings in Study 4 by illustrating the basic effect of goal magnitude 
on distortion under ambiguous situations.  
In addition, rather than using a Likert scale type attitude measure for 
judgmental biases as in Studies 1-4, Study 5 utilized a choice paradigm similar to al  
‘unconscious choice’ studies and directly showed the biases in choice among 
judgmental options. The benefit of this paradigm, besides providing a behavioral 
alternative to the attitude measure, is that biases are exhibited in a more 
straightforward fashion, and since there is a specific judgment that is clearly accurate 
(e.g., choice of the non-diluted tea) it can serve as a reference point for dem nstrating 
























Chapter 4: Title of Chapter 4 
The first aim of the present series of studies was to test the hypothesis that 
motivated biases are resource dependent and therefore scarcity of cognitive resources 
should result in less distortion. Three studies employed the same judgment task 
wherein undergraduate UMD students were asked to judge how much UMD versus 
Duke was deserving of an award, with the objective information provided on both 
school’s relative track and field performance highly ambiguous. These three studi s 
also adopted the same subliminal priming technique to prime either a basing goal to 
identify with one’s own university (UMD) or an accuracy goal. However, these 
studies also differed in important ways. 
Study 1 varied the presentational format of the track and field performance 
information with either an easy-to-process tabular format or a complex narrative 
format shown to be more difficult to process. Results from Study 1 demonstrate that 
participants biased their judgments toward favoring UMD when they were primed to 
identify with their own university and the information was easy to process. However, 




In order to conceptually replicate the findings from Study 1, and also rule out 
the alternative explanation that the results were dependent on the specific formats f 
information, Study 2 kept the same tabular form across conditions while cognitive 
resources were manipulated via a prior cognitive task (i.e., the Stroop task) that was 
either easy (low resource depletion condition) or difficult (high resource depltion 
condition). As in Study 1, participants who were presented with a UMD identification 
prime again exhibited ingroup favoritism by overvaluing the performance of UMD
team, but only when their resources were relatively intact (after engaging in an easy 
version of the Stroop task) as opposed to depleted (after engaging in a difficult 
version of the Stroop task).  
Study 3 retained the same narrative form of the information across all 
conditions and measured Working Memory Capacity as a proxy for individual 
differences in cognitive resources (rather than situationally manipulating this variable 
as was done in Studies 1 and 2). Results illustrate that participants with higher WMC 
formed more biased judgments compared to those with lower WMC when they were 
motivated to favor their own university. Besides conceptually replicating the findings 
from Study 2, Study 3 also helped to rule out the shared alternative explanation for 
both of the preceding studies (and for that matter, any procedure relying on situational 
manipulation of cognitive resources) regarding the possibility that the situational 
manipulation in-and-of itself changed the participants’ biasing or accuracy motivation 
in any particular way. Studies 1, 2, and 3 therefore provide convergent evidence 




 The second hypothesis the current research sought to test was that distortion 
difficulty resulting from unambiguous or clear information in a judgment task can be 
overcome by a biasing motivation with a sufficiently strong magnitude. Studies 4 and 
5 were thus carried out to examine the roles of relative goal magnitude and stimulu  
ambiguity in motivated biases. The two studies each used judgment scenarios and 
goals presumed to be relevant to college students’ everyday life and goals, and 
examined biases in judgment through either a measure of attitude (Study 4) or an 
actual choice behavior (Study 5).   
Specifically, Study 4 manipulated relative goal magnitude through 
enhancement of either an academic success goal (in line with the judgment task) or a 
social wellbeing goal (the biasing goal) via an open-ended question focusing on either 
goal. At the same time, it orthogonally varied the stimulus ambiguity parameter by 
presenting participants with either balanced information or only negative arguments 
on the effectiveness of group-learning for achieving good academic performance. 
Consistent with my analysis, Study 4 found that when group-learning (congruent with 
the biasing goal) was presented as clearly ineffective (representing a low ambiguity 
and high constraints condition), even though participants’ judgment reflected such 
low effectiveness in their attitude measure in the academic goal condition, those with 
the biasing (i.e., social wellbeing) goal enhanced overcame the ‘reality constraints’ 
and still rated group-learning as rather positive.  
Unexpectedly, Study 4 did not find a difference in judgment between the two 
goal conditions under high stimulus ambiguity, in other words, the dependent 




address this problem, as well as conceptually replicate the findings from Study 4 
regarding the overriding role of strong biasing goal under high reality constraints, 
Study 5 was conducted, which pitted a biasing health goal against neutral concerns i  
a tea tasting judgment task. Cross-cutting the parameter of relative goal magnitude, 
Study 5 also manipulated the variable of stimulus ambiguity via the creation of actual 
quality difference between two iced teas. The two teas were labeled differently, with 
one neutral (“everyday smooth”) and the other promising healthful benefits 
(“nutrition essential”). A 20% diluted version of the original tea was found to reduce 
the subjective taste preference significantly in a pilot study and was therefore used for 
the low ambiguity (i.e., high clarity) manipulation wherein the “nutrition essential” 
tea was the less tasty of the two teas.  
 When not diluted (high ambiguity condition) the “nutrition essential” tea was 
overchosen among participants with enhanced health concerns while participants with 
neutral concerns chose the two teas at a 50-50 ratio. More importantly, under high 
clarity (i.e., the 20% dilution condition), although participants with neutral concerns 
were sensitive to the actual quality difference between the two teas and selected the 
original quality “everyday smooth” tea as the tastier tea, participants with health 
concerns enhanced still overchose the “nutrition essential” tea despite the dilu ion. 
The reasons given by the participants were invariably in terms of “taste”, in line with 
the explicit judgment task of choosing the better tasting tea. Overall, then Study 5 
provides support for the overriding effect of a strong biasing goal on motivated biases 




less likely under ‘normal’ circumstances, such ‘reality constraints’ can be overcome 
when the magnitude of the biasing motivation is high enough. 
Over the past few decades, several independent lines of research in social 
psychology have provided conclusive evidence for the existence of motivated biases 
in judgment. Once the phenomenon of motivational effects on judgment was 
established, the next generation question was to delineate its boundary conditions 
(Zanna and Fazio, 1982). A major such boundary condition concerned the “reality 
constraints” exercised by the informational environment confronting the individual 
(Kunda, 1990). According to this notion, people are not at liberty to conclude 
whatever they want to; rather, people attempt to be rational and to construct a 
justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade themselves as well as 
dispassionate observers. Thus the extent of distortion is constrained by one’s ability 
to construct such justifications. Clarity of the information afforded to the perceiv r 
defines such a constraint. The clearer the information, the more difficult it may be to 
deny, reframe, or suppress it despite one’s motivation.  
Based on Freud’s concept of defense mechanisms (1920) and Kunda’s notion 
of possible mediating processes in motivated bases (1990), several possible 
underlying mechanisms may enable distortion. These include: (a) 
suppression/inhibition of undesirable or motivation inconsistent information, (b) 
denial of obvious “reality” features, and (c) generation of counter-arguments to 
undesirable information involving a possibly laborious memory recollection or an 
effortful construction of new, motivationally desirable counterarguments. Hence, if 




degree of difficulty, the effectuation of distortion should require overcoming the 
difficulty involved, for which one would need sufficient cognitive and/or 
motivational resources. 
As noted earlier, distortion can be also made difficult if one’s cognitive 
resources have been drained through processing the information per se (e.g., if the 
information is long and complex, if the concepts are novel to a lay person and require 
certain level of expertise), or via concurrent cognitively demanding tasks (e.g., 
background noise, multiple tasks). Resources can become scarce from completion of 
prior fatiguing tasks or certain individuals (e.g., those with relatively low working 
memory capacities) may not have much cognitive resources to begin with. Under 
these conditions one will have few cognitive resources left (i.e., residual resourc ) 
for distorting the information after processing it. This also suggest that if onehas 
sufficient amount of residual resources after processing information these resources 
could be utilized for greater distortion leading to more biased judgment.  
 Much has been said regarding the influence motivational and cognitive factors 
can exert on the extent and direction of information processing and judgment. High 
processing motivation and high cognitive resources have been shown to generally 
increase the amount of relative objective information processing (e.g., processing 
both arguments and heuristics rather than only heuristics, and assigning weight to 
different pieces of information in a relatively objective manner rather than a biased 
manner) and therefore increase the quality of judgment when the dominant 
motivation is neutral (e.g., need for cognition, need for accuracy). But the present 




and of sufficient magnitude, the presence of motivational and cognitive resources can 
increase judgmental bias in a motivationally congruent direction.  
Results from my first three studies are consistent with the prediction that 
distortion decreases when individuals’ cognitive resources are drained from 
processing complex and lengthy information (Study 1), or from a prior cognitively 
demanding task (Study 2), or if one has a chronically low cognitive capacity (Study 
3), controlling for the relative magnitude of the biasing goal. Holding the cognitive 
resources parameter constant, Studies 4 and 5 investigated the possibility that a 
sufficiently strong biasing motivation can overcome distortion difficulty in highly 
constraining situations (i.e., high information clarity). Data from these two s udies 
support the hypothesis. High information clarity (low ambiguity) was shown to 
significantly reduce the extent of distortion when a biasing goal was of relatively low 
magnitude. However, when the biasing motivation was relatively dominant it 
successfully overcame the barrier to distortion created by such reality constraints.  
The findings from Studies 1-5 are an encouraging first step en route to 
understanding the parameters and dynamics of the fundamental processes involved in 
motivated biases. Yet a great deal of further work is necessary in order to obtain all of 
my objectives. While the first three studies focused on cognitive resources in the 
process of motivated distortion, Studies 4 and 5 more systematically investigated the 
role of relative goal magnitude in the phenomenon when stimulus ambiguity in the 
situation is quite low and, therefore, constraints for distortion are rather high. 
Although evidence exists demonstrating the effect of stimulus ambiguity (or “reality 




construct of distortion difficulty that can be also affected by other considerations as 
well. All together, Studies 1-5 show that distortion difficulty (from different sources) 
can be overcome given a sufficient amount of cognitive (attentional) resources, and 
motivational resources.  
One other important moderator of motivated biases is the perceived 
conduciveness or instrumentality of a judgment to the biasing goal. Other factors 
being constant, the more conducive a judgment is perceived to be to a biasing goal, 
the greater the distortion in terms of the tendency to perceive this particular judgment 
as accurate. Suggestive evidence in support of this implication is provided by the 
unconscious choice studies (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Kruglanski et al., 2005, Study 
1-4), wherein the choice items were of equal quality (and therefore were equally as 
accurate to the judgment of choosing the best quality item), yet specific choices were 
made because of their conduciveness to specific biasing goals. At the same time, the 
reasons the participants gave for their choices were invariably phrased in terms of the 
quality of the items, a framing in line with the judgment goal. In my current series of 
studies, Study 4, in particular, provides more direct evidence for this moderating 
effect, as group-learning was viewed as more effective in achieving academic success 
when it was perceived as conducive to a biasing social wellbeing goal (i.e., making 
friends), with other factors controlled for. 
Results from Study 4 and 5 suggest that where the inherent accuracy of a 
judgment (e.g., low ratings of group-learning or the choice of the original quality 
‘everyday smooth’ iced tea) is distinctly higher than that of other judgments (the low 




wellbeing or health concerns) is distinctly lower than that of other judgments, the 
choice between judgments should be determined by the relative magnitude of the 
implicit judgmental accuracy goal and the biasing goal such that the goal with higher 
magnitude overrides that with lower magnitude. That is, if the dominant goal is to 
make an accurate judgment then ‘focal override’ should occur but when the biasing 
goal is of a much higher magnitude it could ‘override’ the ‘focal override’ effct.  
It is now time to revisit the notion that distortion is resource dependent. 
Though the idea that mental resources (e.g. attentional resources) can enhance
motivational biases is novel and seemingly at odds with the general notion that the 
presence of resources increases judgmental objectivity and accuracy, this is not meant 
to suggest that resources produce distortions under all circumstances. Rather, it would
be incumbent on future research to identify the moderating conditions under which 
resources introduce bias versus enhancing accuracy. One possibility is that resources 
are employed in the service of the dominant motivation. If so, where the accuracy 
motivation was of a higher magnitude than the biasing motivation, resources would 
decrease bias. However, where the biasing motivation was of greater magnitude than 
the accuracy motivation (presumably the case in the present studies), the presence of 
resources would enhance bias. These possibilities could be fruitfully investigated in 
subsequent research. 
The phenomena of motivated bias are ubiquitous in human affairs. Sometimes 
bias in judgment can be functional and beneficial. In this vein, Taylor and Brown 
have argued that positive illusions are adaptive as they increase motivation and 




counterproductive and possibly dangerous (Weinstein, 2004). Imagine, for instance, a 
patient distorting or denying his/her problematic health situation such as playing 
down the seriousness of early symptoms of a severe disease. Such person may avoid 
or refuse to undergo the necessary medical procedures, hence allowing his or her 
condition to deteriorate.  
Alternatively, individuals who distort an abusive relationship and judge it as 
normal might end up as long-term victims. Thus, fully understanding the underlying 
mechanisms of motivated bias is quite important in a variety of cases, and rich in its 
implications for ways of coping with life’s adversities. Particularly, understanding the 
moderating roles of factors such as cognitive resources and relative magnitude of 
biasing motivation could have implications for purposefully enabling/disabling or 
enhancing/reducing distortion when these seem beneficial to the individuals 


























Ioften find ourselves faced with all kinds of ethical dilemmas such as these listd 
below.  
There are good reasons for people to react to these dilemmas in a lot of different 
ways. 
Please write down, on the blank page provided to you, how you would react if you 
were in these situations and explain in as much detail as possible why you would 




You are the TA of a class. A student after receiving a B+ from the class comes to you 
and shows you her transcript. This is her last class in college and she is currently 
applying for graduate school. Her GPA without the grade from this class just passes 
the requirement of the graduate program she wants to get in but the grade from this 
class is going to make her GPA drop below the minimum requirement. She begs you 
to move her grade to A- but you think this wouldn’t be fair to other students in the 




You’re jogging on the street one day. You happened to see some high school girls 
teasing and bullying another girl. It’s getting pretty bad and it seems like it’ll 




Dilemma 3 (Your own dilemma): 
Please recall some ethical dilemma you have experience in your own life? Please 




















For college students, all kinds of study groups could be a good way to build 
meaningful and long lasting social networks that prove to be beneficial to both their 
personal lives and careers. The forms of study groups include those where classmates 
get together for homework or class projects at school, and they can also be the virtual 
study groups that students do over the internet using IM or facebook, etc. In these 
study groups, students engage in deeper and problem solving oriented 
communications compared to usually superficial tasks in other forms of college 
socializations. Also group studies often involve much more sophisticated socialization 
skills such as sharing information, finding out and utilizing each other’s unique angle 
and expertise, negotiation and collaboration, in order to work together efficiently to 
complete a complex task. Furthermore, in such occasions students are more 
motivated to work and socialize with other students that are not necessary similar to 
them, as in the case of other forms of socializations. By interacting with people 
different from them, either personality or knowledge, or general background, or even 
culture wise, they develop a broader view and deeper understanding of social groups 
and have the opportunity to build beneficial social skills that would help them 
interact and cooperate with people different from them at work place after they 























Research on group dynamics has shown that group-learning can 
have both advantages and disadvantages for individual 
performance.  
 
Below are some commonly found pros and cons of group learning. 
Can you think of an instance, based on YOUR PERSONAL 
EXPERIENCE, for each of them?  
 
In order for us to better understand these behaviors involved in 
group-learning, please write down one instance for each of these 
pros/cons in as much detail as possible.  
 


















(All negative information) 
 
Research on group dynamics has shown that, group-learning tends 
to be more detrimental than beneficial to individual performance. 
 
Below are some commonly found disadvantages of group-learning. 
Can you think of an instance, based on YOUR PERSONAL 
EXPERIENCE, for each of them?  
 
In order for us to better understand these behaviors involved in 
group-learning, please write down one instance for each of these 
items in as much detail as possible.  
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